There is a story about a distinguished mathematician who had been invited to deliver a course of advanced lectures to other high-powered students of mathematics on a subject about which he was known to have some original ideas. The course, however, got off to a slow start. He devoted three lectures to discussing whether a certain proposition P was or was not self evident. The proposition P was essential to the argument he wanted to develop. Happily, he was able to (...) announce at the opening of his fourth lecture that he had decided that P was self evident. There was an audible sigh of relief. It was now known, on the highest authority, that P was self evident. From that the argument proceeded briskly and with irresistible logic to the lecturer's surprising and devastating conclusions. (shrink)

In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which (...) is sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research. © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Biological Sciences. (shrink)

This new addition to the series New Studies in Practical Philosophy edited by W. D. Hudson is a study of deontic moral judgment, in particular of moral concepts which embody standards for the assessment of claims to right or wrong actions. Three main theses are quite clearly stated. The first thesis concerns the distinctive character of the moral point of view which is irreducible to either logical or factual considerations. The second thesis is that moral judgments claim interpersonal validity in (...) the sense that the speaker makes the implicit claim that every reflective agent who considers the judgment "ought to agree" with the judgment as a correct one. The third thesis pertains to the moral disagreement. It is maintained that moral disagreements are "in principle" decidable, not by way of deductive subsumption under the criteria governing the uses of moral concepts, but by a method of inquiry analogous to that of scientific inquiry involving the use of hypothesis. The author acknowledges his debt to Arthur Prior, J. Kovesi, and M. Polanyi. The book is good in raising questions on the relation between moral inquiry and scientific inquiry, the significance of the open texture of moral terms and its relation to ethical argumentation, and the problem of reconciling differences of moral beliefs in the setting of their connection with nonmoral beliefs.—A. S. C. (shrink)

This is a sustained attack on what the author termed "decido-phobia"—the fear of making fateful decisions. The book begins with an illuminating discussion of ten popular strategies of decido-phobia. Of particular interest to moral philosophy is the attack on "moral rationalism" which "claims that purely rational procedures can show what one ought to do or what would constitute a just society". "Moral irrationalism" is also criticized for ignoring the relevance of reasons "when one is confronted with fateful decision". An ethics (...) of autonomous men is proposed as an alternative to decido-phobia. This ethics involves four cardinal virtues of love, honesty, courage, and "humbition," the last a new coinage for "fusion of ambition and honesty." Both the concepts of justice and guilt are subjected to detailed criticism, since they constitute the chief obstacles on the road to autonomy. Unlike Kantian autonomy, Professor Kaufmann focuses on that which "consists of making with open eyes the decisions that give shape to one’s life". There is no need of Kantian maxims or categorical imperative. Autonomy involves a new integrity or high standards of honesty which consist in a sort of lived intellectual honesty that is characteristic of a mind that is open to alternatives and spirit of questions. Alienation is regarded as a price of autonomy. A searching critique of current conceptions of alienation is given in Chapter 6. The author recommends a creative autonomous way of life. In his concluding words "guilt is mired in the past, as is retributive justice. Distributive justice is struck in the present, but by the time it has figured out how to cope with that, it is dated. We must move beyond guilt and justice. We must give up the pleasant notion that we can have all good things at once. What is best is not things at all but creative autonomy". This is an important theme and requires closer scrutiny of its central arguments and its suggested alternative ethics of creative autonomy.—A.S.C. (shrink)

These volumes provide a large introduction to the works of modern value theory from their beginnings in J. Bentham, F. Nietzsche, and H. Lotze to the more recent Anglo-American studies. Volume I is concerned with "the German-Language Group." Extensive discussion is devoted to the views of F. Brentano, A. Meinong, C. von Ehrenfels, J. C. Kreibig, E. Heyde, H. Rickert, H. Münsterberg, M. Scheler, K. Wiederhold, W. Stern, F. Wilken, M. Beck, and V. Krafts. It provides a good conspectus of (...) varieties of nineteenth century value theories. The author aims at an exposition rather than critical treatment of the various philosophers. Each chapter contains a useful bibliography. Of more contemporary interest is Volume II which deals with the Anglo-American Group. One finds here a detailed presentation of the theories of W. M. Urban, J. Dewey, B. Bosanquet, D. Prall, C. G. Shaw, R. B. Perry, D. H. Parkel, W. Stern, A. C. Garnett, J. N. Findlay, E. Brightman, B. E. Jessup, C. I. Lewis, R. Lepley, S. C. Pepper, Everett Hall, R. Hartman, and W. D. Lamont. Shorter discussions deal with works of A. L. Hillard, E. M. Adams, and K. Aschenbrenner. Liberal quotations from original sources are interspersed throughout the exposition. The clarification of issues is not always successful. The author does provide a good focus, however, for important passages from the works discussed. Regrettably, one finds an omission of the view of David Pole, the absence of a summary section on each theory discussed, and the absence of an index. Nevertheless, the students of value theory can find in this work a useful tool of research. The comprehensive scope provides a rich variety of contributions to the important field of value theory.—A.S.C. (shrink)

An account and development of Arthur Murphy's Theory of Practical Reason and its application to contemporary moral problems. Chapter II gives a schematic account of Murphy's theory of normative discourse. Chapter III contrasts this theory with other theories and approaches. The author justly remarks that "Murphy's intent has been primarily to restore proper balance among considerations that play a role in practical discourse and to steer clear of the pitfalls which would impair or diminish the effectiveness of reason in human (...) actions." Chapter IV deals with "the contemporary erosion of practical reason and critique of existentialistic [[sic]] ethics." Chapter V contains an interesting discussion of Murphy's conception of developing and dynamic self as responsible agent. It gives recognition to the moral self as basic condition that underlies the activity of practical justification. The final chapter undertakes practical applications of the theory expounded. The monograph is a good exposition and defense of Murphy's important contribution to contemporary moral philosophy.--A. S. C. (shrink)

This book is another work on the voluminous literature on the Private Language Argument. The author devotes his arguments solely to a refutation of "anti-private language thesis" as it appears in the articles of N. Malcolm, J. D. Carney, and Newton Garver. Two arguments of the thesis are considered without ascription to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The first is the familiar "The Diary Keeper Argument" found in Wittgenstein : "The claim that the supposition that one could keep a record of a (...) particular kind of sensation having no publicly observable behavioral or circumstantial indicators is unintelligible". Smerud’s attack on this argument in part relies on Ayer’s paper "Can There Be a Private Language?" on the issue of recognition. For the issue on the criterion requirement, Smerud appealed to J. J. Thomson’s paper "Private Languages" as a basis for argument. No note is taken of the criticism of the relevance of verification principle to the issue in D. Locke’s Myself and Others. (shrink)

This book is a sustained criticism of John Rawls’ comprehensive work on the theory of justice. While recognizing the significant contribution of Rawls to both ethics and social theory in articulating clearly a distinct and coherent version of liberalism, Barry believes that "Rawls’ theory does not work and that many of his individual arguments are unsound." In the introductory chapter, the author gives an illuminating comparison of Rawls’ work with Henry Sedgwick’s Methods of Ethics. Throughout the book, critical references have (...) been made to Rawls’ views expressed in the earlier papers. Critical attention is given to the notions of the original position, primary goods, and the thin theory of the good and their relation to Rawls’ contractarian principles of justice. (shrink)

This book is an appreciative exposition of Bergson’s Two Sources of Morality and Religion. It maintains that Bergson has a "revolutionary doctrine of the nature of morality." Although the author did not attempt to relate Bergson’s moral philosophy to the contemporary philosophical scene, she did fully display a base in which Bergson’s account can be evaluated in contemporary terms. Of particular interest is Bergson’s distinction between morality of obligation and morality of aspiration, or between static and dynamic morality. The former (...) is a morality of social pressure, the latter a morality of exceptionable individuals who reveal to men "new and higher moral goals." Bergson centers his attention to the morality of aspiration on mystical experience as the "peak" emotional experience. Questions may be raised whether this account can appropriately apply to Oriental mystics, for example, Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu and the Zen Buddhists who seem to give no role to emotion in their account of alleged mystical experiences. It is doubtful whether all paradigmatic individuals recognized by Bergson can be regarded as unequivocal expression of the emotion of love. This narrow account of Bergson on the morality of aspiration does not detract from the importance of at least some analogous distinction to focus on the standard-guiding function of paradigmatic individuals in various moral practices. (shrink)

A useful report on the health and prospects of sixteen disciplines, ranging from such traditional sciences as anthropology and political science to such recent ones as cybernetics and game theory. Each field is examined as to its proper content, methods, current results, present controversies and terminological difficulties. The authors offer assessment and a limited bibliography for each, as well as a guide to more general literature on behavioral science. It is suggested that inadequate understanding of modern scientific methods and confusion (...) over terms prevail, but that hope lies in the direction of interdisciplinary effort.—N. S. C. (shrink)

Chiefly a treatment of two problems in the philosophy of history: the nature of historical understanding, and its bearing upon political life, science and philosophy. As regards the first, the author proposes an account of what it is to follow an "evidenced narrative." The burden of discussion of the second is to argue for positive uses of historical understanding, including its capacities for moral guidance, and its use for appreciating how philosophical problems may be clarified.—N. S. C.

A discussion of the development of the idea of history in Western thought, some current views of the nature of history and the condition of contemporary American academic history. The author rejects such views as that history is a science and that historical interpretation improves with greater distance in time from past events, and criticizes excessive specialization in the structure of graduate education in history and the prevailing canons of historical writing. He writes that today we have "better training, more (...) resources, more monographs, more historians, and, generally speaking, worse history."—N. S. C. (shrink)

Social philosophy with heady aims. The author sets out to "reconstruct the ontology of natural society," i.e., to develop a scheme that copes with all aspects of man qua social being. The chief influences are perhaps Whitehead and Aristotle. The upshot seems largely a program, leaning on a "functional" view of the mind, and a principle of evolution.—N. S. C.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. A more apt title would have been, "A Marxist Critique of Husserl’s Nullification of the Real World." Such a title would have made the central argument and underlying concern in the present discussion more explicit. The author is intent on a spirited refutation of Husserl’s phenomenology as a transcendental, phenomenological idealism. It is particularly this stage of Husserl’s phenomenological development, maintains Sang-Ki Kim, that effects a sacrifice of the real world. The belated (...) return to the life-world, characteristic of Husserl’s later thought, does not, according to the author, help matters much. Husserl’s analysis of the life-world continues to be informed by the anti-historical apriorism that defined his earlier program of phenomenological idealism. Husserl’s concept of the life-world thus remains a bloodless abstraction, bereft of any acknowledgement of the concrete, historical, naturalist-materialist basis that undergirds it. (shrink)

R. S. Peters, C. A. Mace; VII—Emotions and the Category of Passivity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 117–142, h.

The Morality of Civil Disobedience is a clear, direct, well-written analysis of the concept of civil disobedience. Professor Hall proposes a minimal definition of civil disobedience on which he then builds a theoretical framework alleged to be morally neutral. He concludes by presenting a substantive method for amending the present legal system to permit a more direct responsiveness to moral issues. The minimal defining characteristics are "the illegality of the act, and the alleged moral nature of its justification." This eliminates (...) as constitutive elements such factors as: agent’s willingness to be arrested and punished, use of nonviolence, full publicity of act, etc. Several benefits accrue. First, this minimal definition permits cogent and useful distinctions between legal injustices and immoral laws, disobedience and revolution or rebellion, disobedience and crime. Second, a morally neutral definition allows a theoretical formulation which can encompass a number of diverse moral stances. Third, by limiting the defining characteristics to the above, the author can effectively distinguish between the concept of civil disobedience and what counts as grounds for justification. Further, by introducing the notion of prima facie obligation as necessary elements of justification, Professor Hall gives the problem a flexible and useful framework. The analysis is coherent and relatively complete. Whatever moral commitments are presumed within this theory seem minimal, easily acceptable to the reader, and quite necessary for any kind of substantive program. The author has made extensive and judicious use of legal as well as philosophical works in this field. He has defended and explicated his theoretical proposals with numerous relevant case studies. These practical illustrations tend not only to clarify the issue, but to direct the reader’s attention to dealing creatively with a contemporary problem of paramount political importance. An extensive bibliography refers the reader to important source materials from both legal and philosophical works.—S. C. (shrink)

In a fluent, easy-to-read style, Frondizi presents a useful, elementary analysis of the nature of value; the basic problems of value theory; an historical survey of the various solutions to these problems; and finally, his own theory concerning the answers to these issues. The basic problem of axiology is exposed by the author as the dilemma between subjectivism and objectivism. It is in this frame of reference that the views of R. B. Perry, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, and Russell are briefly (...) outlined as examples of subjectivist doctrines. The material apriorism of Max Scheler is described in detail as illustrative of objectivism. Because the theories of Scheler are not too well-known among English-speaking philosophers, the exposition of his doctrines by Frondizi in this text are particularly useful and interesting. Between the Scylla of 'de gustibus non est disputandum' and the Charybdis of absolute standards of value Frondizi asserts the theory that "value is a Gestalt quality, the synthesis of objective and subjective contribution, and which exists and has meaning only in concrete human situations." Value is viewed as open-ended--able to be "furthered by the constant exercise of man's imagination, intelligence and action." Although it may be an open question as to whether the notion of Gestalt somehow resolves basic problems in axiology, it is, nevertheless, interesting to consider Frondizi's account. The book is also useful for its inclusion of a bibliography at the end of each chapter.--S. C. (shrink)

R. S. Peters, C. A. Mace; VII—Emotions and the Category of Passivity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1 June 1962, Pages 117–142, h.

A clarification of ambiguities in the notion of free decision. Concentrating on ordinary English usage, Ofstad distinguishes six senses of free decision. One of these, freedom as power, is exhaustively treated. A skillful attempt is made to relate the analyses of free decision, which form the bulk of the book, to the concepts of duty, responsibility, and the author's own ethical position. One helpful appendix lists and indexes all propositions concerning freedom of decision as it is analysed throughout the book. (...) --E. S. C. (shrink)

In this brilliant and baffling essay, Merleau-Ponty reaps a harvest of insights upon the basis of his previous penetrating studies of perception and language. Again we find massively argued denials of neat Cartesian distinctions, such as those supposed to hold between space, depth and color. Inspired by the author's intimate acquaintance with the modern art movement, and quoting frequently from its masters, the essay gives back to painting its own voice and autonomy. Much like the body itself, painting is held (...) to be our most direct and revealing access to the lived world—that is, to Being itself.—E. S. C. (shrink)

A readable attempt to reconcile methods, materials, and results in the arts and sciences. The author stresses similarities, but does not overlook crucial differences, in key notions such as patterns of discovery and methods of formulation.--E. S. C.

The deepest beliefs’ about personal identity whose consequences Unger seeks to draw out are the beliefs of those who already share his theoretical convictions; and his pain-avoidance’ experiments show nothing unless one already assumes those convictions. If there is a risk’ that I may not survive a brain operation even though I know exactly which chunks of brain will be removed and replaced, that shows that I am a separate thing from my body and brain, about which the latter provide (...) normally reliable, but still fallible evidence. (shrink)